Saturday, March 3, 2012

CryptoForma Edinburgh

Last talk at the CryptoForma meeting held in Edinburgh was given by Nadhem AlFardan from Royal Holloway.
He presented the work titled "Plaintext-Recovery Attacks Against Datagram TLS" that received the best paper award at NDSS this year.

Datagram TLS (DTLS) is a TLS extension suitable for datagram transport. It was introduced in 2004 and its implementations can be found either in OpenSSL and GnuTSL.

The attack shown is a padding oracle attack. Informally, padding oracle attacks work by adjusting a ciphertext in some specific way before input it to an honest decryptor. If a padding error is returned, then the adversary is able to gain some information about the underlying plaintext.
For instance, the padding oracle attack mounted against TLS in OpenSSL introduced by Vaudenay, makes use of timing differences due to the fact that messages with bad padding were rejected faster than other messages.

Since DTLS does not return error messages when processing invalid padding, implementation of DTLS should be resistant to such kind of attacks.

Interestingly, the vulnerability presented by Nadhem shows that such attacks are still possible by exploiting the timing of heartbeat response messages or that of any responses with a predictable delay sent by any upper-level protocol instead of error messages. The work also introduces techniques to amplify the timing differences which makes use of "trains" of valid or invalid packets.

No comments:

Post a Comment