This is the latest in a series of blog posts to address the list of '52 Things Every PhD Student Should Know To Do Cryptography': a set of questions compiled to give PhD candidates a sense of what they should know by the end of their first year. In this week, we discuss the difference between a covert channel and a side-channel.
Covert channels and side-channels are two types of information leakage channels.
A covert channel uses mechanisms that are not intended for communications, e.g., writing and checking if a file is locked to convey a “1” or “0”. In a covert channel an insider process leaks information to an outsider process not normally allowed to access that information. The insider (sending) process could be a Trojan horse program previously inserted stealthily into the computer. An outsider (receiving) process need only be an unprivileged process .
In side-channel attacks, also known as passive non-invasive attacks, the cryptographic device is essentially attacked as it is, i.e. only directly accessible interfaces are exploited. The device is not permanently altered and therefore no evidence of an attack is left behind. The basic idea of side-channel attacks is to determine the secret key of a cryptographic device by measuring its execution time, its power consumption, or its electromagnetic field .
In a physical side-channel attack, unconventional techniques are used to deduce secret information. Typically, the device has been stolen or captured by the adversary who then has physical access to it for launching a physical side-channel attack. Traditional side-channel attacks involved differential power analysis and timing analysis. Different amounts of power (or time) used by the device in performing an encryption can be measured and analysed to deduce some or all of the key bits. The number of trials needed in a power or timing side-channel attack could be much less than that needed in mathematical cryptanalysis .
In software side-channel attacks a victim process inadvertently assumes the role of the sending process, and a listening (attacker) process assumes the role of the receiving process. If the victim process is performing an encryption using a secret key, a software side-channel attack allows the listening process to get information that leads to partial or full recovery of the key .
 Wang, Zhenghong, and Ruby B. Lee. "Covert and side channels due to processor architecture." Computer Security Applications Conference, 2006. ACSAC'06. 22nd Annual. IEEE, 2006.
 Mangard, Stefan, Elisabeth Oswald, and Thomas Popp. Power analysis attacks: Revealing the secrets of smart cards. Vol. 31. Springer Science & Business Media, 2008.
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