This year, the Bristol Cryptography Group is doing something slightly different with our weekly study groups. Each member of the group has been tasked with talking about "the best paper [they've] read this year".
This means that papers we're presenting won't all be particularly recent, but (hopefully) interesting and exciting bits of work.
I kicked things off last week by talking about Attacking and Fixing PKCS#11 Tokens , which is from CCS '10. I started my PhD just over a year ago and this was one of the first papers I read. It has stuck with me as a model of good scientific writing: the exposition is very clear, the content is cleanly presented and one doesn't need to have a huge amount of prerequisite knowledge in order to follow the methodology. More importantly, even a non-specialist reader can understand the main result of the paper and appreciate its significance.
In brief: the authors used a formal, symbolic model to analyse a number of commercial security devices implementing a standard key management API called PKCS#11. Of the 17 tokens tested, "9 were vulnerable to attack, while the other 8 had severely restricted functionality." As I said, one doesn't need to have a PhD in Cryptography in order to get the point: real security devices were seriously flawed. In fact, they allowed you to obtain secret keys in plaintext.
A security token is designed to provide access to sensitive material in insecure environments. Your company might want you to access their (sensitive) system from your (potentially insecure) house, so they give you a USB stick (or similar) to bridge the gap. The token will do cryptography for you and your personal laptop, which could be infested with malware, won't be able to directly access the secret keys stored on the token. Instead, there's an API - an interface - between your machine and the token. Moreover, the token is (supposedly) tamper-resistant, so one cannot learn the key values by breaking open the hardware.
The most popular API for security tokens is PKCS#11, which is described in a vast document that was first published in the mid '90s and has been updated very little since then. The trouble is, while the document itself is public , the implementation of its contents within each security token is typically unknown to all but the token's manufacturer. So, while attacks on the standard had been known for quite some time prior to the publication of this paper [3, 4], it was unclear whether these attacks could actually be mounted on real devices. Perhaps the manufacturers had been smarter than those who had written the standard and had avoided the many pitfalls by adding extra safeguards?
Of course not. Compliance trumps security every time.
The authors of the paper built a tool that reverse-engineers a token to deduce its functionality, builds a formal model to represent this functionality, finds an attack in the model and then attempts to implement this attack on the real device. While the formal model is quite sophisticated, the attacks are not. Of the five presented in the paper, three are obvious non-compliance with the standard (such as the token just handing you a secret key in plaintext if you ask for it!) and the other two are versions of the famous Wrap/Decrypt attack first found in 2003 . The only tokens that were not vulnerable to these basic attacks were those that disabled key wrapping (encrypting a key under another key) altogether, but this is an important feature of key management APIs.
It is, in fact, possible to do key wrapping in a secure way, but it requires great care. There has been some research in this direction since 2010, including my own ongoing work, but I don't have space to elaborate on this here.
For me, the take-home message from this paper is that, if you don't prove the security of your security device, it's probably insecure. This insecurity makes for fun academic papers, but is also rather worrying when your device is widely used in the real world.
 - http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1866307.1866337
 - http://docs.oasis-open.org/pkcs11/pkcs11-base/v2.40/pkcs11-base-v2.40.pdf
 - http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-540-45238-6_32
 - http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/Publis/PAPERS/PDF/DKS-tfit08.pdf